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I. Introduction 
The landmark Hamdan v. Rumsfeld1 decision, issued by the Supreme Court on 
June 29, 2006, introduces significant changes in the American tradition of judicial 
deference. At the same time, it sheds new light on the separation of powers doc-
trine, the role of the Supreme Court, the application of international humanitarian 
law as well as the rights of Guantanamo detainees within the framework of the war 
on terror. It is a rather rare incident that a decision of the Supreme Court makes its 
way to the daily newspapers all over the world and has such tremendous interna-
tional resonance. Not only the daily press in the United States, but also in Europe, 
dedicated its front pages and commentaries to Hamdan.2 The fact that Justice 
T h o m a s  read parts of his dissent from the bench (something he has not done in 
15 years on the Court) also marks the importance of this decision. It is against this 
background that the significance of the Hamdan decision needs to be gauged.  
Part II of this study provides a summary of the proceedings and opinions of the 
Supreme Court Justices in the Hamdan case. Part III, sub-section 1 analyses the 
line of cases decided by the Supreme Court within the context of the war on terror. 
It also shows how the judges have reached their conclusions in Hamdan. Part III, 
sub-section 2 presents an overview of the separation of powers doctrine and how it 
has been interpreted by the B u s h  Administration. It further demonstrates how 
the Supreme Court has deferred in the past to Presidential assertions of war power, 
and that the Hamdan decision, in this context, clearly departs from this earlier ap-
proach. Part III, sub-section 3 analyses the impact of the decision on the interpre-
tation of international humanitarian law by the Supreme Court. In part IV of this 
study, other relevant questions not considered in the seminal judgment are dis-
cussed. 
II. Decision Summary 
1. Case History 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress adopted a Joint 
Resolution authorising the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
                                                        
1
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Supreme Court of the United States, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006). 
2
  See for the United States: High Court Throws out GITMO Tribunal, The Washington Times; 
High Court Curbs War Powers, Chicago Tribune; High Court Rejects Detainee Tribunals, The 
Washington Post. See for Europe: La Cour suprême inflige un camouflet à M. Bush, Le Monde; Su-
preme Court Rejects Bush Terror Powers, The Guardian; Bush’s Claim to Unfettered Power is 
Curbed, Daily Telegraph; La Cour surpême déclare illégaux les tribunaux de Guantanamo, Le Figaro; 
Abus de pouvoir, Le Temps; Sternstunde für Amerika, Tages Anzeiger; Die Militärtribunale in Guan-
tánamo für unrechtmässig erklärt, Neue Zürcher Zeitung; Kein “Blankoscheck” für Guantánamo, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Stoppschild für Bush, Die Zeit; Guantanamo-Tribunale sind illegal, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (all articles date from June 30, 2006). 
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against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks (…) in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States of America by such nations, or-
ganizations or persons”3. Pursuant to this Resolution, the President ordered the 
Armed Forces of the United States to intervene in Afghanistan.  
On November 13, 2001, the President also issued a military order (the Novem-
ber 13 Order) which was intended to govern the detention, treatment and trial of 
non-US citizens.4 This order allows to try by military commission any non-citizen 
for whom the President determined that there is reason to believe that he or she 
was or is a member of al Qaeda or has engaged or participated in terrorist activities 
aimed at the United States. The military commission can order imprisonment or 
death of a detainee. 
Salim Ahmed H a m d a n , a Yemeni national, was caught in November 2001 dur-
ing hostilities between the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan. He was 
captured by Afghani militia and turned over to the U.S. military. He was then 
transported to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay in June 2002, and a year 
later, the President considered that pursuant to the November 13 Order he should 
be subjected to trial by military commission.  
In December 2003, a military counsel was appointed to represent him and he 
filed demands for charges and a speedy trial pursuant to Article 10 of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)5. These applications were denied by the legal ad-
viser to the Appointing Authority who found that H a m d a n  is not entitled to the 
protection of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. On July 13, 2004, H a m d a n  
filed habeas corpus and mandamus petitions in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Washington. 
Following this, he was charged with one count of conspiracy. The charging 
document clarified that from on or about February 1996 to on or about November 
2001 H a m d a n  wilfully and knowingly joined an enterprise of persons who 
shared a common criminal purpose and conspired and agreed with certain mem-
bers of al Qaeda to commit terrorist acts.6 There was no allegation that H a m d a n  
had any command responsibilities, played a leadership role or participated in plan-
ning any activity. Rather, the charging document determined that H a m d a n  acted 
as bodyguard and personal driver for Osama b i n  L a d e n , arranged transport and 
transported al Qaeda weapons, drove and accompanied Osama b i n  L a d e n  dur-
ing his visits and received training at al Qaeda sponsored camps.7  
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington trans-
ferred H a m d a n ’ s  petitions to the United States District Court for the District of 
                                                        
3
  Authorisation for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
4
  Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 57833 (2001). 
5
  Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801, 802, 893, and 924 (1956). 
6
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (note 1) supra, 2761. 
7
  Ibid. 
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Columbia. Furthermore, a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened and 
decided that H a m d a n  should continue to be detained at Guantanamo Bay as he 
was an “enemy combatant”. 
While in the meantime proceedings before the military commission commenced, 
the District Court granted H a m d a n ’ s  petition for habeas corpus and stayed the 
proceedings before the commission. It was found that the Third Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War8 applies to H a m d a n , and that 
he is entitled to prisoner of war status until adjudged otherwise. It was also con-
cluded that the military commission was established in violation of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the same Geneva Convention 
because the accused would never hear nor see the evidence against him.9  
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed by ruling that the 
Geneva Conventions10 were not judicially enforceable and that they did not apply 
to H a m d a n .11 It was also held that H a m d a n ’ s  trial before the military commis-
sion would violate neither the Uniform Code of Military Justice12 nor the U.S. 
Armed Forces regulations intended to implement the Geneva Conventions.  
On November 7, 2005, the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to decide 
whether the military commission convened to try H a m d a n  has the authority to 
do this and whether the Geneva Conventions apply to this case. Chief Justice 
R o b e r t s  recused himself as he had ruled on this case, at lower instance, in the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
2. Majority and Plurality Decision 
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals and Justice 
S t e v e n s  delivered the judgment for the Court. He also delivered the plurality 
judgement in which Justice K e n n e d y  did not join his opinion. 
                                                        
 
8
  Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force 
October 21, 1950, for the United States February 2, 1956.  
 
9
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.C. 2004). 
10
  Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force October 21, 1950, for the United States February 2, 
1956; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force October 21, 1950, for the United 
States February 2, 1956; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (note 8); Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force 
October 21, 1950, for the United States February 2, 1956. 
11
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F. 3d 33 (D.C. Cir., 2005). 
12
  UCMJ (note 5) supra. 
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2.1. Justice S t e v e n s ’  Majority Decision 
In the majority judgement, it was held that the military commission created to 
try H a m d a n  did not comply with U.S. military law and the Third Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War13. In relation to jurisdic-
tional issues, the US Government’s motion to dismiss the case under Section 1005 
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)14, which gave the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of cases 
tried by military commission, was denied. The Court found that Congress did not 
include any language in the Act which would indicate that its jurisdiction is pre-
cluded.15 
The Court rejected the Government’s argument, based on Schlesinger v. Coun-
cilman,16 that abstention is appropriate in this case. In Councilman, it was con-
cluded that federal courts should normally abstain from intervening in pending 
courts-martial against service members.17 It was found that this reasoning did not 
apply in the circumstances of this case. Justice S t e v e n s  was more persuaded by 
Ex parte Quirin18, where the Court decided to intervene “[i]n view of the public 
importance of the question raised by [the case] and of the duty which rests on the 
courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to preserve unimpaired the con-
stitutional safeguards of civil liberty, and because in our opinion the public interest 
required that we consider and decide those questions without any avoidable de-
lay”19. As the Government did not raise any countervailing interest, the Court de-
cided to exercise its jurisdiction as provided in the Constitution of the United 
States.  
Moving on to the substantive issues of the case, the Court stated that “[t]he mili-
tary commission, a tribunal neither mentioned in the Constitution nor created by 
statute, was born of military necessity”20. Considering briefly the history of mili-
tary commissions, the Court concluded however that “[e]xigency alone, of course, 
will not justify the establishment and use of penal tribunals not contemplated by 
Article I, § 8 and Article III, § 1 of the Constitution unless some other part of that 
document authorizes a response to the felt need”21. According to the Court, “(…) 
that authority, if it exists, can derive only from the powers granted jointly to the 
President and Congress in time of war”22. Quoting Ex Parte Milligan23, the Court 
                                                        
13
  Third Geneva Convention (note 8) supra. 
14
  Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), P.L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005). 
15
  The jurisdictional issues discussed in the Hamdan case are not the main focus of this article and 
they will not be considered here in great detail. 
16
  Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975). 
17
  Ibid., 740 and 758. 
18
  Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
19
  Ibid., 19; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (note 1) supra, 2772. 
20
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (note 1) supra, 2772-2773. 
21
  Ibid., 2773. 
22
  Ibid., 2773. 
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clarified that “Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns, nor can the Presi-
dent, or any commander under him, without the sanction of Congress, institute 
tribunals for the trial and punishment of offences, either of soldiers or civilians, 
unless in cases of a controlling necessity, which justifies what it compels, or at least 
insures acts of indemnity from the justice of the legislature”24. The Court ab-
stained, however, from ruling on whether the President may constitutionally con-
vene a military commission without prior agreement from Congress in cases of 
controlling necessity. 
It was reminded that, following Ex Parte Quirin25, Article 21 of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice26 does not provide a sweeping mandate to the President to 
convene military commissions when he deems necessary. Furthermore, the Ham-
dan court explained that there is nothing in the Authorisation for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF)27 and the Detainee Treatment Act 200528 which seems to indicate 
that Congress intended to expand the existing power of the President. It was con-
sidered that “[t]ogether, the UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA at most acknowl-
edge a general Presidential authority to convene military commissions in circum-
stances where justified under the ‘Constitution and laws’, including the law of 
war”29.  
Subsequently, the Court concluded that the military commission lacks power to 
proceed because its structure and procedures violate the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice30 and the Geneva Conventions31. As part of the proceedings before the mili-
tary commission, the accused and his civilian counsel may be excluded from the 
trial. The counsel may be precluded from discussing certain evidence with the ac-
cused. The accused and the counsel may be denied access to certain evidence. Any 
evidence which has in the opinion of the presiding officer probative value to a rea-
sonable person is admitted, which includes hearsay and unsworn testimonies. 
Moreover, appeals are heard by a panel of military officers, only one of which 
needs to have experience as a judge. The panel makes its recommendation to the 
Secretary of Defence, who can either remand the case for further proceedings or 
submit the record to the President to take the final decision. According to the 
Court, these procedures violate the common law of war, the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and the law of nations, including the four Geneva Conventions.  
The Court considered that, according to the principle of uniformity, the proce-
dures governing trials by military commission should be the same as those govern-
                                                                                                                                              
23
  Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
24
  Ibid., 139-140. 
25
  Ex Parte Quirin (note 18) supra. 
26
  UCMJ (note 5) supra. 
27
  AUMF (note 3) supra. 
28
  DTA (note 14) supra. 
29
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (note 1) supra, 2775. 
30
  UCMJ (note 5) supra. 
31
  Geneva Conventions (note 10) supra. 
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ing courts-martial. A departure from this principle is allowed, but it “(…) must be 
tailored to exigency that necessitates it”32. Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice33 places two restrictions on the President’s power to promulgate pro-
cedural rules for courts-martial and military commissions: “(a) [t]he procedure, in-
cluding modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military 
commission, and other military tribunals may be prescribed by the President by 
regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of 
law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in 
the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary or inconsistent 
with this chapter. (b) All rules and regulations made under this Article shall be uni-
form insofar as practicable and shall be reported to Congress.”34 Thus, it appears 
that the procedures used in military commissions should be the same as the ones 
used in courts-martial, unless there is sufficient proof that uniformity would be 
impracticable. According to the Court, the President’s determination that it is im-
practicable to apply the rules and procedures governing the trial of criminal cases 
in U.S. district courts to the military commission deserves complete deference. 
However, the majority concluded that “[n]othing in the record before us demon-
strates that it would be impracticable to apply court-martial rules in this case”35. 
The Court even found that the only reason in support of impracticability, namely 
the danger posed by international terrorism, was not sufficient to apply rules dif-
ferent from those governing courts-martial. Hence, the rules specified for H a m -
d a n ’ s  commission were found to be illegal and it was deemed that the rules gov-
erning courts-martial should apply. 
The proceedings adopted to try H a m d a n  also violate the Geneva Conven-
tions36. The Court found that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
erroneously held that H a m d a n  could not invoke the Geneva Conventions in this 
case. It clarified that the Geneva Conventions are indisputably part of the law of 
war, and compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority 
of the military commissions set forth in Article 21 of the UCMJ37 is based. Com-
mon Article 3 provides that, in a conflict not of an international character, occur-
ring on the territory of a signatory, each signatory is bound to respect, as a mini-
mum, certain provisions protecting “persons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
including members of armed forces who laid down their arms and those placed 
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause (…)”38. 
The majority also rejected the Court of Appeal’s alternative holding that Com-
mon Article 3 does not apply because the conflict with al Qaeda is international in 
                                                        
32
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (note 1) supra, 2790. 
33
  UCMJ (note 5) supra. 
34
  Ibid. (italics inserted by the authors). 
35
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (note 1) supra, 2792. 
36
  Geneva Conventions (note 10) supra. 
37
  UCMJ (note 5) supra. 
38
  Geneva Conventions (note 10) supra (italics in the original). 
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scope rather than a “conflict not of an international character”. It explained that 
the expression “not of an international character” bears its literal meaning and it 
can be distinguished from the former conflict which involves a clash between na-
tions. Also, Common Article 3, which applies here, affords at least some minimal 
protection to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor a non-signatory 
involved in a conflict on the territory of a signatory.  
In addition, the Court concluded that various sources confirm that the expres-
sion “regularly constituted court” mentioned in Common Article 3 includes ordi-
nary military courts (in the U.S., these are the courts-martial established by con-
gressional statutes). A military commission can be established according to the 
standards of US military justice if there is some practical need. However, no evi-
dent practical need was demonstrated here.  
Finally, the Court stated that H a m d a n  may be a dangerous individual, but the 
Executive is bound to respect the rule of law prevalent in the United States.  
2.2. Justice S t e v e n s ’  Plurality Opinion 
In his plurality opinion, Justice S t e v e n s  clarified that historically three sorts of 
military commissions have been used and that the commission used to try H a m -
d a n  is a law-of-war commission. According to W i n t h r o p ’ s  treatise39, the pre-
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by such a commission are that, among 
others, it must be limited to trying offences committed within the theatre of war 
and the offence must have been committed during the war. H a m d a n ’ s  case does 
not fulfil these conditions. Furthermore, H a m d a n  has not committed an offence 
which can be tried by a law-of-war military commission. There is no support in ei-
ther statute, precedent or the Geneva and Hague Conventions for law-of-war 
commissions trying conspiracy offences. Moreover, conspiracy is not recognised as 
a violation of law of war by international sources, such as the International Mili-
tary Tribunal at Nuremberg. 
Significantly, the plurality concluded that “[t]he charge’s shortcomings are not 
merely formal, but are indicative of a broader inability on the Executive’s part here 
to satisfy the most basic precondition – at least in the absence of specific congres-
sional authorization – for the establishment of military commissions: military ne-
cessity”40. It was pointed out that the tribunal “(…) was appointed not by a mili-
tary commander in the field of battle, but by a retired major general stationed away 
from any active hostilities”41. Furthermore, H a m d a n  was not even charged  
with an offence “(…) for which he was caught red-handed in a theatre of war and 
which military efficiency demands be tried expeditiously, but with an agreement 
the inception of which long predated the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the 
                                                        
39
  William W i n t h r o p , Military Law and Precedents, War Department, Office of the Adjutant 
General, Washington D.C., rev. 2nd ed. 1920, 831. 
40
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (note 1) supra, 2785. 
41
  Ibid. 
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AUMF”42. It was also emphasised that “[a]ny urgent need for imposition or execu-
tion of judgement is utterly belied by the record; (…)”43. 
Finally, the plurality found that the expression “all the judicial guarantees which 
are recognised as indispensable by civilized peoples” contained in Common Arti-
cle 3 includes the minimum trial protections recognised by customary international 
law. Although the United States refused to ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Con-
ventions44, the Court referred to its Article 75 which describes many of these pro-
tections. It was argued that the Government approved of the safeguards contained 
in this Article. Nonetheless, the procedures used by the military commission im-
plicated in this case fell far short from the protections of Article 75.  
2.3. Justice K e n n e d y 45 
Justice K e n n e d y  wrote another concurring opinion where he indicated that 
trial by military commission raises important separation of power issues. He stated 
that there is a risk “(…) that offences will be defined, prosecuted and adjudicated 
by executive officials without independent review”46. He further agreed with the 
plurality of the Court that the military commission is unauthorised and contra-
venes the Uniform Code of Military Justice47. However, he saw no further need to 
determine whether Common Article 3 requires the presence of the accused at all 
stages of the trial.48 Also, according to his view, the plurality should not have con-
cluded that Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions is binding despite 
the Government’s decision not to ratify it.  
3. Dissidence 
3.1. Justice S c a l i a  
In his dissenting opinion, Justice S c a l i a  was joined by Justices T h o m a s  and 
A l i t o . First, he clarified why the Court does not have jurisdiction in this case, and 
rejected, on this point, the arguments of the majority. He further considered that 
                                                        
42
  Ibid. (italics in the original). 
43
  Ibid. 
44
  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1123 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force De-
cember 7, 1978. 
45
  It should also be noted that Justice B r e y e r  wrote a short opinion in which he was joined by 
Justices K e n n e d y , S u t e r  and G i n s b e r g . He considered that “[n]othing prevents the President 
from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary”. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
(note 1) supra, 2799. 
46
  Ibid., 2800.  
47
  UCMJ (note 5) supra. 
48
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (note 1) supra, 2808-2809. 
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H a m d a n , an enemy alien detained abroad, has no rights under Article I, Sec-
tion (9) (2) of the Constitution which requires that the right to the writ of habeas 
corpus shall not be suspended (unless public safety requires it in cases of rebellion 
or invasion). 
Justice S c a l i a  also noted that equitable principles govern the exercise of habeas 
corpus and injunctive jurisdiction. Pursuant to Article 1005(e)(3) of the Detainee 
Treatment Act49 where Congress provided for an alternative jurisdiction, the prin-
ciples of equity dictate that the Supreme Court should not intervene in this case. 
According to his view, the majority found erroneously that the comity reasons in 
favour of abstention mentioned in Schlesinger v. Councilman50 do not apply here. 
Also, the majority did not give due consideration to the question whether there are 
any military necessities against interference. Furthermore, the Court should avoid 
getting “(…) into direct conflict with the Executive in an area where the Execu-
tive’s competence is maximal and ours is virtually nonexistent. We should exercise 
our equitable discretion to avoid such conflict. Instead, the Court rushes headlong 
to meet it”.51 
3.2. Justice T h o m a s  
Justice T h o m a s  affirmed the judgement of the Court of Appeals. As Justice 
S c a l i a , he considered that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to try H a m -
d a n ’ s  claims. The President’s decision to try H a m d a n  before a military com-
mission, included in the Authorisation for Use of Military Force52 and Article 21 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice53, is entitled to deference. He explained 
that in circumstances where there is express or implied authorisation from Con-
gress, the President’s actions are “(…) supported by the strongest of presumptions 
and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion (…) 
rest[s] heavily upon any who might attack it”54. He considered that, in such cir-
cumstances, the Court’s “(…) duty to defer to the Executive’s military and foreign 
policy judgement is at its zenith: it does not countenance the kind of second-
guessing the Court repeatedly engages in today”55. These are “(…) decisions of a 
kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and 
which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to 
judicial intrusion or inquiry”56. Furthermore, he found that the Executive fully sat-
                                                        
49
  DTA (note 14) supra. 
50
  Schlesinger v. Councilman (note 16) supra. 
51
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (note 1) supra, 2822 (italics in the original). 
52
  AUMF (note 3) supra. 
53
  UCMJ (note 5) supra. 
54
  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
(note 1) supra, 2824. 
55
  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (note 1) supra, 2825. 
56
  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 582-583 (2004). 
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isfied the pre-conditions for exercise of jurisdiction mentioned in W i n t h r o p ’ s  
treatise57.  
He also disagreed with the Court’s finding that the commission lacks power to 
proceed because of its failure to comply with the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice58 and the Geneva Conventions59. T h o m a s  argued referring to Madsen v. Kin-
sella60 that the procedure of military commissions is not prescribed by statute but 
“(…) adapted in each instance to the need that called it forth”61. In contrast to the 
Court’s finding, he argued further that Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice62 is not an attempt on part of Congress to limit the President’s power. This 
perception is contrary to the text and structure of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice63 as well as to the precedents.  
Justice T h o m a s  rejected the Court’s contention that H a m d a n ’ s  military 
commission is unlawful because it violates Common Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions64 and H a m d a n ’ s  argument that it violates various provisions of the 
Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 65. He 
considered that these arguments are foreclosed by Johnson v. Eisentrager66, where 
the Court found that the respondents cannot assert that “(…) anything in the Ge-
neva Conventions makes them immune from prosecution and punishment for war 
crimes”67.  
According to T h o m a s , “[t]he judicial nonenforceability of the Geneva Con-
ventions derives from the fact that those Conventions have exclusive enforcement 
mechanisms (…) and this, too, is part of the law of war”68. The Court’s interpreta-
tion of Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice69 “selectively incorpo-
rates only those aspects of the Geneva Conventions that the Court finds conven-
ient, namely, the substantive requirements of Common Article 3, and not those as-
pects of the Conventions that the Court, for whatever reason, disfavors, namely 
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the Conventions’ exclusive diplomatic enforcement scheme”70. Furthermore, 
T h o m a s  considered that H a m d a n ’ s  claim is without merit as the President has 
accepted the opinion of the Department of Justice that Common Article 3 does not 
apply to al Qaeda detainees because the relevant conflict is international in scope. 
The President’s interpretation should be sustained and the Court should not inter-
fere. In any case, T h o m a s  concluded that H a m d a n ’ s  military trial complies 
with Common Article 3 and that it has been regularly constituted in accordance 
with historical precedents. Moreover, it affords “(...) all the judicial guarantees 
which are recognized by civilized peoples (...)”71. H a m d a n  would not be ex-
cluded from his trial if this would render it unfair, but rather only if it is necessary 
to protect classified intelligence. T h o m a s  also stated that the Third Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War does not apply here as, fol-
lowing the President’s determination, the conflict with al Qaeda is not interna-
tional in scope (as al Qaeda is not a signatory to the Geneva Conventions).  
3.3. Justice A l i t o  
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice A l i t o  considered that Common Arti-
cle 3 constitutes the relevant body of law that governs the question whether a court 
has been properly appointed. He explained that Common Article 3 must be inter-
preted in light of domestic law, and that a “regularly constituted court” is a court 
that conforms to the law of the appointing country. Also, according to him, 
Common Article 3 imposes three requirements which are all fulfilled by H a m -
d a n ’ s  military commission: (1) it must be a court; (2) it must be regularly consti-
tuted and (3) it must afford “ (…) all the judicial guarantees which are recognized 
as indispensable by civilized peoples (…)”72. He considered that there is no reason 
to conclude that a court which differs from a regular military court is improperly 
constituted. A municipal court, a state trial court of general jurisdiction or an in-
ternational court are all differently constituted, but they are also regularly consti-
tuted courts.  
A l i t o  argued that Common Article 3 does not preclude the jurisdiction of mili-
tary commissions. He noted that Article 66 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War73 allows an occupy-
ing power to try civilians in its “properly constituted, non-political military 
courts”74. Recognising that Common Article 3 and Article 66 prohibit the existence 
of a special tribunal, he explained that this prohibition does not cover the military 
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commission implicated in this case. This particular military commission is regular 
and not at all special.  
Moreover, the military commission qualifies as a court and it was constituted 
pursuant to an order of the President, just as in Ex Parte Quirin75. According to 
Justice A l i t o , Justice K e n n e d y  erroneously concluded that it is necessary to 
have an acceptable degree of independence from the Executive to render the com-
mission “regularly constituted”. Justice A l i t o  argued that H a m d a n ’ s  commis-
sion was not less independent than the one in Ex Parte Quirin. Also, the commis-
sion procedures which allow the Secretary of Defence to change the governing 
rules from time to time and which permit the admission of any evidence of proba-
tive value do not undermine its legitimacy.  
III. Analysis 
1. Line of Cases in the War on Terror 
1.1. General Remarks 
Despite the Supreme Court’s traditional tendency to abstain from interfering 
with the Executive’s war time decisions, the post 9/11 Court actively affirms its 
unwillingness to follow this direction further. The Court is increasingly attempting 
to limit Presidential powers not mandated by Congress in the war on terror and 
refuses to accept the Government’s argument that persons designated as enemy 
combatants can be detained indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay. Hamdan v. Rums-
feld76 constitutes another encouraging occurrence in the Supreme Court’s quest for 
restoring the rule of law and due process in the case of Guantanamo detainees.  
Two earlier decisions of the Supreme Court shed further light on the context of 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and elucidate how the Justices arrived at their current posi-
tions. In these cases, the Supreme Court started to interpret executive war powers 
narrowly and to intervene more in situations where national security interests were 
at stake. In balancing both national security needs and civil rights, the Court ap-
plied a higher standard of scrutiny in the evaluation of the arguments presented by 
the Executive. 
1.2. Rasul v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States 
On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush and Al Odah v. 
United States77 that United States courts had jurisdiction to examine challenges re-
garding the legality of foreign nationals’ detention at the Guantanamo Naval Base. 
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The plaintiffs in the case were two British citizens, two Australians, and twelve 
Kuwaitis. Significantly, the two British detainees, Shafiq R a s u l  and Asif I q b a l , 
were repatriated to the United Kingdom, where they were released without charge. 
All the suspects were captured abroad during hostilities between the United States 
and the Taliban. 
The six to three ruling established that the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay 
is under U.S. jurisdiction and control, although Cuba had sovereignty over this 
territory. It was also found that Congress had granted federal district courts, under 
the federal habeas corpus statute78, the authority to hear habeas corpus applications 
from Guantanamo detainees. The Court rejected government’s contention that 
Johnson v. Eisentrager79, where it was held that U.S. courts had no jurisdiction 
over German war criminals held in a U.S. administered German prison, should 
control the case. The Court distinguished the case from Eisentrager80 by noting, in-
ter alia, that the detainees were not nationals of countries at war with the U.S., that 
they deny to have engaged in aggression against the U.S. and that they have never 
had access to a tribunal. The Court further added that in any case the statutory 
predicate of Eisentrager81 had been overruled already by a previous decision82, and 
therefore did not preclude the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction. The Court 
also considered other bases for jurisdiction, namely the Federal Question Act83 and 
the Alien Tort Claims Act84. It held that since Eisentrager85 did not bar jurisdiction 
over the plaintiffs’ habeas corpus claims, it did not bar any other types of claims re-
lating to their detention. 
Although the Court emphatically reminded that “Executive imprisonment has 
been considered oppressive and lawless since J o h n , at Runneymede, pledged that 
no free man should be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed or exiled save by the 
judgement of his peers or by the law of the land”86, it expressly refrained from ad-
dressing the merits of the case and focused on purely jurisdictional issues. Without 
any further guidance or suggestions, the question of determining the procedural 
rights of the detainees was left entirely up to the lower courts. It should be empha-
sised however, that the Rasul decision represented at the time a significant progress 
for the detainees of Guantanamo Bay, as the Court finally rejected the Executive’s 
argument that Presidential war powers cannot be subject to judicial review. From 
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now on, the President would have to justify his detention policy in courts87 and the 
Guantanamo detainees would have a meaningful access to them. This was an im-
portant first step which eventually paved the way to the Hamdan decision, and 
made it easier for the Court to find that it had jurisdiction in the case. As 
S h a p i r o  accurately concluded, “Rasul now stands as a strong reaffirmation of the 
judiciary’s role as the ultimate safeguard against arbitrary detention, in wartime as 
well as peacetime, for aliens as well as citizens”88. 
1.3. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
On June 28, 2004, the Court also decided Hamdi v. Rumsfeld89 which further 
restrained the Executive’s assertions of power in the war on terror. In that case, the 
Court held that although Congress authorised the detention of combatants, due 
process required that they be given a meaningful day in court to contest their de-
tention.  
Yasser H a m d i  was seized in Afghanistan in November 2001 by members of 
the Northern Alliance and he was handed over to the American armed forces. The 
government suspected that he was a Taliban soldier and classified him as an enemy 
combatant. He was first detained at Guantanamo Bay, and when the government 
discovered that he was an American citizen, Yasser H a m d i  was transferred to a 
naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia and then to Charleston, North Carolina. 
Justice O ’ C o n n o r , writing on behalf of a plurality, considered that the Au-
thorisation for the Use of Military Force90 provided sufficient authority for the Ex-
ecutive to detain suspects within the limited circumstances of the case and for the 
duration of the conflict. This issue of congressional authorisation also arose in the 
Hamdan decision, where the majority was reluctant to find any implicit approvals 
on part of Congress. It should be noted however that, in Hamdi, the plurality lim-
ited its holding by finding that Congress did not allow the indefinite detention of 
suspects. It was reminded that, pursuant to the third Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War91, detention may last no longer than active 
hostilities. The decision also made clear that indefinite detention for the purpose of 
interrogation is not authorised. 
Subsequently, the plurality rejected the Government’s contention that an ene- 
my combatant does not have a right to a hearing to contest his detention, and went  
on to decide what process is due to Yasser H a m d i . Using the balancing test of 
Mathews v. Eldridge92, the plurality weighed H a m d i ’ s  private interest in free-
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dom from physical detention and the government’s interest in conducting war suc-
cessfully. The plurality considered the unacceptably high risk of erroneous depri-
vation of liberty as well as the burden imposed upon the military by additional 
procedures, and concluded that a detainee-citizen must receive notice of the factual 
basis for his classification as enemy combatant and he must be able to contest it be-
fore a neutral decision maker.93 On the other hand, when considering the substance 
of the procedures to be used, the plurality observed that they may “(…) be tailored 
to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing 
military conflict”94. The plurality explained that in those circumstances, hearsay 
and a presumption in favour of the Government’s evidence could be accepted. This 
finding stands in great contrast with the conclusion reached by the majority in 
Hamdan regarding the inadequacy of the procedural guarantees applicable by the 
military commission.95  
The Hamdi plurality avoided the question of application of international treaties 
by stating that “[b]ecause we hold that H a m d i  is constitutionally entitled to the 
process described above, we need not address at this time whether any treaty guar-
antees him similar access to a tribunal for a determination of his status”.96 This dif-
fers greatly from Justice S t e v e n s ’  significant reliance on the Geneva Conventions 
in his majority and plurality opinions in Hamdan.97 
In addition, the plurality rejected the Government’s assertion that courts should 
only determine the legality of the broader detention scheme and not examine indi-
vidual cases. Significantly, Justice O ’ C o n n o r  stated that “[i]n so holding, we 
necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers principles 
mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances”98. Fi-
nally, the plurality restated the famous phrase from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co 
v. Sawyer99 and emphatically affirmed that “[w]e have long since made clear that a 
state of war is not a blank cheque for the President when it comes to the rights of 
the Nation’s citizens”100. More surprisingly, one of the most conservative Justices, 
Antonin S c a l i a , issued a dissenting opinion that was joined by John Paul S t e -
v e n s . It made no difference, S c a l i a  argued, whether the Authorisation for Use of 
Military Force101 could be read broadly enough to infer congressional approval of 
H a m d i ’ s  detention. He explained that Congress had not suspended the writ of 
habeas corpus, that the federal courts were functioning, and that President B u s h  
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had no inherent power to detain citizens without charges or access to counsel.102 In 
his view, “[i]f civil rights are to be curtailed during wartime, it must be done 
openly and democratically, as the Constitution requires, rather than by silent ero-
sion through an opinion of this Court”103. 
Although not as significant as the Hamdan decision, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld was 
certainly a step in the right direction, as it further reinforced the Supreme Court’s 
role within the framework of the war on terror. Justice O ’ C o n n o r  expressly op-
posed the Government’s view of the separation of powers where power is con-
densed in a single branch of government. She opined that when individual liberties 
are at stake, the Constitution envisions a role for the three branches of govern-
ment. Justice T h o m a s  was the only one to accept that the Executive legitimately 
exercised its war powers and that its decision should not be second-guessed by the 
Supreme Court.  
Unfortunately, the Hamdi court left many questions open. It did not consider 
the scope of the definition of “enemy combatant”, the appropriate length of deten-
tion of an “enemy combatant” before he or she is given access to counsel, the 
length of detention of an “enemy combatant” in the war on terrorism and the de-
gree to which military hearings are sufficient.104 Furthermore, its consideration of 
international humanitarian law was scanty and less than appropriate. Although, the 
plurality referred on occasion to the four Geneva Conventions105, there was an evi-
dent reluctance on its part to engage in an active consideration of its provisions and 
to examine the relationship between them and U.S. law.106 There was no meaning-
ful consideration as to how the Geneva Conventions may apply to Yasser H a m d i  
in this case. In addition, through an expansive interpretation of the Authorisation 
for Use of Military Force107, the plurality found a basis for the detention and it no 
longer needed an explicit provision on part of Congress. Also, the Court provided 
guidelines for due process which favour the government rather than citizens at-
tempting to challenge their classification as “enemy combatants”.108 These inade-
quacies eventually undermine the strong position advocated by the plurality. 
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1.4. The Relationship of the Two Cases to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
In the case law of the Supreme Court relating to the war on terror there is a con-
tinuous development which paves the way to the Hamdan109 decision. In Rasul110, 
the Court affirmed its jurisdiction to hear the case, and in Hamdi111, the Court 
went further to rule that, although Congress authorised the detention of combat-
ants, due process required that they be given a meaningful access to courts to con-
test their detention. In Hamdan, the Supreme Court went beyond Hamdi by hold-
ing that the type of military commission created to try H a m d a n  is illegal. 
In the context of these two decisions, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld represents an im-
portant, albeit not sufficient, advancement in procedural rights for the Guan-
tanamo Bay detainees. The majority held that the structure and the procedures of 
the military commission violate the Uniform Code of Military Justice112 and the 
Geneva Conventions113. It did not specify the exact content of these procedural 
rights, but it considered that they should not differ from those governing courts-
martial and that they should be in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. The 
Court did not consider that it was difficult for the Government to design proce-
dures which conform to the Constitution. This contrasts with Hamdi, where the 
Court found that procedural rights should be designed to avoid imposing any ex-
cessive burden on the Executive. In Rasul, the Court did not consider the scope of 
these rights as it focused on purely jurisdictional issues. The standard of proce-
dural rights advocated by the Supreme Court in the Hamdan decision is therefore 
higher than the one in Hamdi and Rasul. However, the important drawback of the 
Court’s opinion is that it did not explicitly articulate the substance of these proce-
dural rights in the Hamdan decision. 
In addition, the Hamdan decision made a substantial advancement for the appli-
cation of international humanitarian law in the United States. The majority explic-
itly affirmed that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is applicable to 
the case and that it affords at least some minimal protections to Guantanamo de-
tainees. As discussed earlier, in Hamdi the Court made references to the Geneva 
Conventions114 en passant, but it resolved the case on the basis of U.S. law. The Ra-
sul Court did not even mention the Geneva Conventions. The Hamdan Court, on 
the other hand, explained that the Geneva Conventions are part of U.S. law and 
that they are enforceable in the U.S. Finally, in support of its interpretation of 
Common Article 3, the Court also made an impressive reference to customary in-
ternational law as codified in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions.  
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In terms of separation of powers issues, the Court not only affirmed its jurisdic-
tion in considering the case, but it also explained further the role that Congress 
should play in this context. The majority concluded that Congress must give its 
approval to the creation of this type of military commission, and that there was no 
such approval in this case. The Court adopted here a much more active stand to-
wards Congress’ involvement in Presidential war time decisions. Although the 
Hamdi Court had no difficulties in finding sufficient basis for the detention of 
suspects in the Authorisation for the Use of Military Force115, the Hamdan Court 
considered that the same document did not warrant the creation of a military 
commission of this type to try the detainees. This way, the Court cautiously re-
frained from finding implicit congressional authorisations, and thereby reinforced 
Congress’ role within the framework of the war on terror.  
It is also interesting to note that the Hamdan decision involved a non-citizen 
subjected to trial by military commission. This was not the case of Yasser 
H a m d i ,  a U.S. citizen, who was repatriated to the United States and had a more 
meaningful access to the courts. The Hamdan decision was therefore all the more 
ground breaking, as it implicated a non-citizen whose access to U.S. courts was not 
self-evident.  
Finally, the Court’s role and self-conception in the war on terror appear to have 
acquired a new meaning. In Hamdan, the Court attempted to reassert its legitimate 
role assigned by the Constitution and re-appropriated some of its power to adjudi-
cate civil rights cases in times of war and peace. The Court also started to interpret 
Executive powers more narrowly and to ensure that Congress has given its ap-
proval. Furthermore, the level of scrutiny applied by the Court in the context of 
alleged abuse of detainees’ rights is substantially higher. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant innovation is that the Court is also starting to question the merits of the Ex-
ecutive’s war-related decisions. As mentioned previously, the plurality noted in 
Hamdan that military necessity was lacking to convene the type of military com-
mission created to try H a m d a n . More than before, the Court is increasingly re-
fusing to abstain from intervening whenever the Executive raises a national secu-
rity claim.  
2. The National Security Constitution After Hamdan 
2.1. Presidential War Powers 
2.1.1. Constitutional Framework and Case Law 
The theory of separation of powers in the United States is derived from the 
Constitution which enumerates specific and exclusive powers for each branch of 
government. The intent behind this scheme was to provide for a system of “checks 
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and balances” among the three branches, so that a single branch would not be able 
to abuse its power at the expense of another branch or of the American population. 
In the context of war powers, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that 
the President shall serve as “(…) Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual 
Service of the United States (…)”. In addition, Article II, Section 1 states that 
“[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of Amer-
ica”. Pursuant to Article II, Section 3, the President shall also “(…) take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed (…)”. Article I, Section 8 authorises Congress to 
declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, to make 
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, to provide for 
calling forth the militia as well as to provide for organising, arming and disciplining 
the militia. 
These powers are not always exclusive and in many cases they overlap to the 
point of becoming concurrent. Such concurrence would occur, for instance, when 
the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief overlaps with the power of 
Congress to make rules for the regulation of land and naval forces during a war.116 
It has now become accepted that there is some concurrent authority for the Con-
gress and the President.117 It is far from being clear what may be part of this cate-
gory and the courts have provided little guidance on the topic.118 It is also difficult 
to determine which branch prevails in case of conflicting assertions of power.119  
More importantly, the Court has developed a test which sheds further light on 
the question of concurrent power and which is usually used to verify whether one 
branch has overstepped its powers, namely the one suggested by Justice J a c k s o n  
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer120. Justice J a c k s o n  explained that execu-
tive powers vary according to three different situations. In the first situation, 
“[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his 
own right plus all that Congress can delegate”121. In the second situation, “[w]hen 
the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, 
he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight 
in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribu-
tion is uncertain”122. In the third situation, “[w]hen the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its 
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lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus 
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclu-
sive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting 
upon the subject”123. This analysis reveals that executive power is closely inter-
twined with the power of the Congress, and Justice J a c k s o n  suggests that there is 
some concurrent authority in a so-called “zone of twilight”. 
2.1.2. The Practice of the B u s h  Administration 
In contrast to the framework outlined above, President B u s h  seems to rely on a 
unitary theory of executive power under which all executive branch power is 
vested in the President and any incursion on it by Congress should be resisted.124 
This finds support in the signing statements125 issued by President B u s h  when he 
approves a new law. For instance, when the President approved the M c C a i n  
Amendment126 he declared that: “[t]he executive branch shall construe Title X in 
Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the consti-
tutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as 
Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the ju-
dicial power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress 
and the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from 
further terrorist attacks”127. He has used on many occasions similar statements 
constantly emphasising that he interprets law in accordance with his authority to 
supervise the unitary executive and his power as Commander-in-Chief.128 Presi-
dent B u s h  seems to have resorted to the signing statements in order to enforce his 
own interpretation of the law and to increase the power of the executive within the 
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  See further signing statements: Presidential Signing Statements, The American Presidency Pro-
ject, University of California, Santa Barbara, U.S.A, available at: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
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Challenges Hundreds of Laws, The Boston Globe, April 30, 2006. 
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legislative context. He used his veto once129 but usually preferred to issue signing 
statements to circumvent legal requirements and bypass Congress.130  
In addition, President B u s h ’ s  reliance on the theory of unitary executive finds 
support in the Memoranda issued by the government in an attempt to explore the 
legal boundaries of the use of unusual interrogation techniques during the war on 
terror. The 1 August 2002 Memorandum131 maintained that the President had com-
plete discretion in his actions as Commander-in-Chief and that these did not need 
to be approved by Congress132. The Memorandum of December 30, 2004133 issued 
by the Department of Justice was meant to supersede the previous 1 August 2002 
Memorandum and another Memorandum issued on 4 April 2003134. However, the 
new Memorandum did not address nor reject the scope of the President’s Com-
mander-in-Chief powers described in the 1 August 2002 Memorandum135 dismiss-
ing it as unnecessary136. In addition, it appears that subsequent Memoranda issued 
by the Department of Justice have followed the same approach.137 
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2.1.3. The New Approach in the Hamdan Case 
The merits of the unitary executive theory have been vigorously questioned by 
scholars. An alternative and more legally sound theory suggests that “[t]he histori-
cal examination of constitutional structure and relationship that follows suggests 
that our National Security Constitution rests upon a simple notion: that generally 
speaking, the foreign affairs power of the United States is a p o w e r  s h a r e d  
among the three branches of the national government”138. All three branches play 
integral roles in both making and validating foreign-policy decisions139. In this 
process, the President plays a predominant role, but he benefits from a limited 
scope of exclusive powers in relation to diplomatic relations and the recognition of 
governments and nations.140 At the same time, “(…) governmental decisions re-
garding foreign affairs must transpire within a sphere of concurrent authority, un-
der presidential management, but bounded by the checks provided by congres-
sional consultation and judicial review”141. The National Security Constitution 
therefore rests on a principle of b a l a n c e d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n 142 
which ensures that the powers are shared by the three branches.  
Against this background, it can be argued that the majority in the Hamdan deci-
sion relied on this principle of b a l a n c e d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in 
interpreting the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. In fact, be-
tween the lines of the majority’s opinion, it is apparent that Justice S t e v e n s  at-
tempted to resuscitate the delicate balance of powers between the branches 
through its finding that the President lacked power to create this type of military 
commission and by refusing to find an implicit congressional authorisation. At the 
same time, the Court re-appropriated some of its legitimate power to control both 
branches in this context. This also finds support in the language and arguments 
used by the Court.143 More than before, its view depicts the powers of all three 
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branches as being shared and it forecloses the President’s theory of unitary execu-
tive.  
As demonstrated in Parts I and II of this paper, the Supreme Court has been try-
ing to curb Presidential assertions of power in the Hamdan decision. However, 
this is a new tendency, as historically, the courts have generally demonstrated their 
deference to Presidential claims of power. The following sub-section illustrates and 
discusses the tradition of judicial deference, as exemplified in three cases decided at 
the time of World War II. It then attempts to contrast these cases with the decision 
in Hamdan, in order to demonstrate how the Supreme Court has recently 
breached this long-established tradition. 
2.2. World War II Case Law: A Tradition of Judicial Deference 
2.2.1. The Traditional View of Deference 
In the context of war, judges have usually refrained from intervening in deci-
sions taken by the Executive or from passing judgements about the wisdom of a 
given policy. It was thought that the matter was within the expertise, domain, 
province or discretion of the government and that it should not be second-guessed 
by justices unable to form an informed opinion on the topic.144 It was also con-
ceived that the Executive needed to have substantial discretion in order to wage 
war successfully. This judicial approach, now called “judicial deference” or “judi-
cial tolerance”145 has become widely accepted to the point of becoming a tradi-
tion.146 It is especially apparent in the decisions delivered by the Court in the 
World War II era, namely in Ex Parte Quirin147, Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United 
States148and Johnson v. Eisentrager149. 
In Ex Parte Quirin150, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of a military commis-
sion over eight Germans who travelled to the United States to carry out sabo-
tages.151 It also upheld the government’s determination that the eight men were 
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unlawful combatants, deprived of prisoner of war status and the protection of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments and Article III, Section 2. Ex Parte Quirin is gener-
ally viewed as a typical example of judicial deference to the decisions of the Execu-
tive in times of war.152 The Court very promptly found Congressional authorisa-
tion for creating military tribunals in the Articles of War and decided that the 
President had the necessary statutory authority. It distanced itself from the deci-
sion in Ex Parte Milligan153 where the Court was reluctant to recognise that citi-
zens can be tried by a military commission. It simply assumed that proceeding by 
military commission in this case was an appropriate solution. In addition, it ap-
pears to have considered that “unlawful combatants” or “enemy combatants” can 
be deprived of various procedural safeguards found in the Constitution without 
questioning the merits of such a contention. The Supreme Court circumscribed the 
role of federal courts in cases where the exercise of Presidential war powers was 
involved. At the same time, this lack of interference allowed the President to have 
more room for manoeuvre in his war time decisions. 
The Court’s use of deference continued and was further demonstrated during 
the internment of Americans of Japanese descent. Many internees contested their 
detention and this gave rise to controversial court decisions. One such decision 
was Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States154 where the Court decided six to 
three that an exclusion order allowing the internment of Americans of Japanese an-
cestry was constitutional. It was found that military necessity and the need to pro-
tect against espionage outweigh the rights of Americans of Japanese ancestry.  
The Court merely reiterated the government’s contention that the exclusion was 
based on military necessity: “Like curfew, exclusion of those of Japanese origin 
was deemed necessary because of the presence of an unascertained number of dis-
loyal members of the group, most of whom we have no doubt were loyal to this 
country. It was because we could not reject the finding of the military authorities 
that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from 
the loyal that we sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the 
whole group.”155 While it was noted that exclusion from one’s home carries with it 
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great hardship, the Court found that this was one of the burdens that citizens must 
endure during war.156  
For Justice B l a c k , this was not a case of racism, but rather a carefully thought 
out strategy in times of military necessity: “To cast this case into outlines of racial 
prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, 
merely confuses the issue. K o r e m a t s u  was not excluded from the Military Area 
because of hostility to him or his race.”157 Finally, giving the full benefit of doubt 
to the Executive, Justice B l a c k  noted that: “There was evidence of disloyalty on 
part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, 
and time was short. We cannot – by availing ourselves of the calm benefit of hind-
sight – now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.”158 Curiously, Jus-
tice B l a c k  announced at the beginning of his judgement that he would apply a 
strict standard of scrutiny, but none of the Government’s claims were really scru-
tinised.159 This blind faith in Government became tragic when it was later found 
that the Government had misrepresented information regarding the military neces-
sity of interning Americans of Japanese descent.160  
Unfortunately, the tendency of judges to abdicate their duties continued beyond 
Korematsu161. In 1950, the Supreme Court decided in Johnson v. Eisentrager162 that 
21 Germans held in custody by the U.S. Army in Germany after having engaged in 
espionage in China and having been convicted there by a military commission, had 
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no right to a writ of habeas corpus to contest their detention.163 It was found that 
these prisoners were at no relevant time on U.S. territory, and that their trial was 
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any U.S. court. 
In relation to the separation of powers doctrine, the Court noted that the “[e]xe-
cutive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been 
deemed, throughout our history, essential to war-time security”164. It was also 
opined that “[c]ertainly it is not the function of the Judiciary to entertain private 
litigation – even by a citizen – which challenges the legality, the wisdom, or the 
propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in spending our armed forces abroad of to 
any particular region”165. Also, reviewing whether the military commission had ju-
risdiction or not in the absence of hostilities and martial law166 “(…) involves a 
challenge to conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs, for which the President is 
exclusively responsible”167. The Court left the consideration of the 27 July 1927 
Geneva Convention168 to the end and quickly found that there was no violation of 
Articles 60 and 63. Thus, having established that granting jurisdiction over this case 
would create military concerns, the Court preferred to leave the question to the 
Executive. 
In this decision, the majority has paid great deference to the Executive’s factual 
findings. As Justice K e n n e d y  accurately pointed out, “[t]he decision in Eisen-
trager indicates that there is a realm of political authority over military affairs 
where the judicial power may not enter”169. Under the label of extraterritoriality, 
the Court circumvented its legal duty to adjudicate the case. Once again, the Court 
put all its faith in the factual basis presented by the government. Applying a prag-
matic reasoning, the Court thought that it would open the flood gates if it granted 
the relief sought to the petitioners, which would in return undermine the military’s 
ability to conduct war. It was also concerned about the image of the U.S. Army 
and about the hardship that it would suffer as a result of such a decision. Clearly, 
in this case, the Court’s motive was not the protection of individual rights and lib-
erties. The Court could have considered that an increased workload should have 
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no bearing on this case and it could have emphasised that the military should also 
abide by the Constitution abroad (extraterritoriality should be no shield in cases of 
human rights abuse). Unfortunately, none of these arguments were mentioned in 
the majority’s opinion.  
There are several reasons which might explain why the Supreme Court decided 
to pay deference to the Executive in the three cases discussed above. First, the 
Court was concerned about its institutional competence.170 Judges are not trained 
in military affairs, and they have been reluctant to overrule governmental decisions 
based on intelligence and complex policy issues. In these three cases, the Court 
simply trusted the Government that there was sufficient military necessity to jus-
tify the decisions taken. Justices felt that they lacked the necessary experience and 
expertise to second guess the Executive in this area. Second, the Court seems to 
have construed the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief very broadly 
so that they include a wide range of war-related decisions.171 These powers seem to 
include the right to override civil rights and liberties when the President claims 
that there was a military necessity. Third, the Court could also have resorted to ju-
dicial deference because of its concern for institutional credibility. Ultimately, the 
authority of the Supreme Court, just as the one of any other judicial body, de-
pends on the acceptance of its decisions by the other branches. Fourth, the Court 
may have abstained from intervening because some information was misrepre-
sented or withheld.172  
2.2.2. The New Approach in the Hamdan Case 
The Hamdan173 decision clearly differs from the three cases discussed in this sec-
tion. In fact, it seems to break away from the tradition of judicial deference and to 
reaffirm the Court’s legitimate role in cases involving national security questions. 
The reasons for which the Court deferred to the Executive’s decision 50 years ago 
are not necessarily applicable today and they were not so convincing to the Ham-
dan Court. The Court did not feel anymore that it lacked expertise to intervene in 
the case or that it should wait to intervene until the final outcome of ongoing mili-
tary proceedings is known. Instead, the Court’s main consideration was the public 
importance of the question raised and its duty to uphold civil rights in times of war 
and peace.174  
Furthermore, in contrast to the three cases discussed, the Hamdan Court con-
strued Presidential powers as Commander-in-Chief narrowly. As there was no ex-
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press Congressional authorisation to convene the type of military commission cre-
ated to try H a m d a n , the Court had to conduct an inquiry to verify whether the 
Commission is legally justified. It was found that the President’s Commander-in-
Chief powers do not include the authority to create this particular type of body. In 
reaching its conclusion, the majority was not concerned whether the Administra-
tion would respect its decision, although this may have been the case in the past. 
The plurality even stated that there was no military necessity to create a military 
commission. Perhaps it should also be added that the Hamdan decision was de-
cided under different military circumstances than the three cases mentioned, which 
may explain the different approach taken by the Court. Here, there was no war in 
the traditional sense, but rather an indefinite conflict with unknown enemies and 
boundaries.  
A further important innovation is Justice S t e v e n s ’  reminder that Congress has 
important powers in times of war which interact closely with those of the Presi-
dent. Through a citation of Ex Parte Milligan175 he reminded that “Congress can-
not direct the conduct of campaigns, nor can the President, or any commander un-
der him, without the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for the trial and pun-
ishment of offences, either of soldiers or civilians, unless in cases of controlling ne-
cessity (…)”176. Justice S t e v e n s  abstained, however, from defining what may con-
stitute a controlling necessity and left the question open. In addition, the Supreme 
Court seems to have opted for a procedural approach by requiring the Executive 
to substantiate the existence of such a necessity. Thus, it was clear for the Court 
that in this area the Executive shares the burden of proof.  
Following the Hamdan decision, the role of the Court in cases involving Presi-
dential war powers has changed significantly. The Court is now more willing to 
scrutinise the evidence presented by the Government and to find that it is insuffi-
cient or lacking. It is no longer a rubber stamp for any of the President’s war-
related decisions. Furthermore, in evaluating national security interests competing 
with civil rights and liberties, the Court carefully balances both of them. The 
Court seems to have reaffirmed its role and duty, conferred by Congress, to up-
hold civil rights and liberties in times of war and peace. More than previously, it is 
also guided by considerations of public interest and refuses to trade in clear abuse 
of civil liberties for unproven national security concerns or military necessity.177  
                                                        
175
  Ex Parte Milligan (note 23). 
176
  Ibid., 139-140. 
177
  It would have been easy for the Court in Hamdan (note 1) supra, to rely on the same arguments 
as in Korematsu (note 148) supra, but fortunately it did not. 
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3. The Importance of Hamdan for the Reception of International 
 Law by the Supreme Court 
Shortly after the Supreme Court has ruled on Hamdan, the decision was gener-
ally commented in the daily newspapers as a victory for the rule of law and the 
Geneva Conventions. Besides the fact that the Hamdan decision is one of the most 
significant rulings on presidential power since World War II, the Supreme Court 
expressed also its attitude towards a corpus of the most important international 
law treaties – the ius in bello, the humanitarian law as codified in the Geneva Con-
ventions. Generally, the Supreme Court is not known for integrating international 
law or rulings of international decision making bodies in its case law.178 Therefore, 
the question arises whether the Hamdan decision marks a new era in the reception 
process. 
The Court rejected the argument that the Geneva Conventions are not directly 
applicable. This clarification was important and obviously not self-evident.179 Con-
cerning the method of the Court for the interpretation of the Geneva Conventions 
it is worth mentioning that the Court based its finding on the International Com-
mentary of the Geneva Conventions180. 
The Court left open the important question of whether the war between al 
Qaeda and the United States is a conflict in the meaning of Common Article 2 of 
the Geneva Conventions. By that, the Court avoided a statement on the controver-
sial question whether the Guantanamo prisoners have the status of prisoners of 
war.181 However, the Salomonian dictum by the Supreme Court confers to the 
                                                        
178
  See Helen K e l l e r /Daniela T h u r n h e r r , Taking International Law Seriously, Bern 2005,  
46 et seq. and 147 et seq. For a criticism of the generally introverted approach of the Supreme Court, 
see Ruth B. G i n s b u r g , Looking Beyond Our Borders. The Value of a Comparative Perspective in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 22 Yale Law & Policy Review, 329-337, 330 (2004) or Ruth B. G i n s -
b u r g , Gebührender Respekt vor den Meinungen der Menschheit: Der Wert einer vergleichenden 
Perspektive in der Verfassungsrechtsprechung, 32 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 341, 342 et 
seq. and 345 et seq. (2005). 
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  See the summary of arguments of the Court of Appeals, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (note 1) supra, 
2793 et seq. 
180
  Ibid., 64; Oscar M. U h l e r /Henri C o u r s i e r /Frédéric S i o r d e t /Claude P i l l o u d /Roger 
B o p p e /René-Jean W i l h e l m /Jean-Pierre S c h o e n h o l z e r , Commentary: IV Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Geneva, 1958 (first reprint in 1994). 
181
  See Michael B o t h e , Töten und getötet werden – Kombattanten, Kämpfer und Zivilisten  
im bewaffneten Konflikt, in: Klaus Dicke et al. (ed.), Weltinnenrecht, Kiel 2005, 67-84, 68 et seq. and 
79 et seq. There is an ongoing debate as to whether (and to what extent) international terrorists are 
protected by the Geneva Conventions. For further information see: Marco S a s s ò l i , The Status of 
Persons Held in Guantanámo Bay Under International Humanitarian Law, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 96 
(2004); Dinah S h e l t o n , The Legal Status of the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Innovative Elements 
in the Decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of 12 March 2002, 23 Hum. Rts. 
L.J. 13 (2002) and Judith W i e c z o r e k , Der aktuelle Fall: Der völkerrechtliche Status der Gefangenen 
von Guantanámo nach dem III. Genfer Abkommen über die Behandlung der Kriegsgefangenen vom 
12. August 1949, 15 Humanitäres Völkerrecht 88 (2002). See also infra, Part IV, Section 2 on 2. Enemy 
Combatant Status, page 38. 
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Guantanamo prisoners at least the minimal protection of Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions. 
As regards the methodological approach, the Court’s interpretation of fair trial 
is even more astonishing. Here, the Court relied on Article 75 of Protocol I to the 
Geneva Convention – although the United States have not ratified Protocol I.182 
The Court stressed that Article 75 of the Protocol I codifies customary interna-
tional law.183 In the concluding remarks the Court made abundantly clear that the 
military commission was not in conformity with Common Article 3: “Common 
Article 3 obviously tolerates a great degree of flexibility in trying individuals cap-
tured during armed conflict; its requirements are general ones, carted to accommo-
date a wide variety of legal systems. But requirements they are nonetheless”184. 
The ease with which Justice S t e v e n s  argued for the majority in favour of in-
ternational law is deceptive. In his concurring opinion, Justice K e n n e d y  made a 
general comment: “There should be reluctance (...) to reach unnecessarily the ques-
tion whether (...) Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions is binding 
law notwithstanding the earlier decision by our Government not to accede to the 
Protocol.”185 Moreover, Justice T h o m a s ’  dissenting opinion makes clear that the 
international law issue was difficult: “The President’s interpretation of Common 
Article 3 is reasonable and should be sustained. (...) Instead, the Court, without ac-
knowledging its duty to defer to the President, adopts its own, admittedly plausi-
ble, reading of Common Article 3. But where, as here, an ambiguous treaty provi-
sion is susceptible of two plausible, and reasonable, interpretations, our precedents 
require us to defer to the Executive’s interpretation.”186 Finally, Justice A l i t o  
takes, contrary to the majority of the Court, an approach which ultimately rests on 
domestic law: “I interpret Common Article 3 as looking to the domestic law of the 
appointing country (...). Accordingly, ‘a regularly constituted court’ is a court that 
has been appointed, set up, or established in accordance with the domestic law of 
the appointing country.”187 
Generally speaking, several aspects interact in the reception process.188 We have 
to bear in mind that every judge is in a difficult situation confronted with a clash 
between international and national law. Normally, judges – especially those of the 
highest constitutional court – think of themselves as guardians of the national legal 
order and not as custodians of international law. In those cases in which the rela-
tionship between international and national law is combined with a horizontal 
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  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (note 1) supra, 2797 et seq. 
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  Ibid. 
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  Ibid., 2798 (italics in the original). 
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  Ibid., 2809. 
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  Ibid., 2846. 
187
  Ibid., 2851. 
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  Helen K e l l e r , Rezeption des Völkerrechts. Eine rechtsvergleichende Studie zur Praxis des 
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separation of powers question, the Supreme Court tends to support the Executive 
prerogatives and to decide in favour of the domestic law.189 This attitude would 
have been possible if the Court only had wanted to uphold the Government’s po-
sition in the case at hand. Given this background, the Hamdan decision is not self-
evident. 
Certain aspects in the Hamdan decision favoured the “international law-
friendly” result. First, the international rules in question are not disputed, well es-
tablished and generally accepted in the international scene. This holds true for the 
Geneva Conventions. Second, the Supreme Court is familiar with the use and 
meaning of a certain rule defined on the international level. Concretely, the Court 
could rely on the important commentaries to the Geneva Conventions190. This 
shows the importance of such opera. Third, the Supreme Court was able to base its 
decision not only on international, but also on domestic law. The implementation 
of the guarantees granted in Common Article 3 in the UCMJ191, paved the way for 
the “international law-friendly” result. Fourth, the absence of a congressional au-
thorisation for a breach of the international law obligation is important as well. 
The Supreme Court made it clear: As soon as Congress will authorise the Presi-
dent’s approach for the trial commission, despite opposing international law obli-
gations, the Court would consider to be bound by such a national decision. 
The circumstances in which Hamdan was decided also facilitated the “interna-
tional law-friendly result”. However, there is little hope that the Hamdan decision 
marks a new era for the attitude of the Supreme Court towards international law in 
general. This holds in particular true when Hamdan is read in connection with the 
decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon192, decided a day earlier, where the Supreme 
Court gave a rebuke to the International Court of Justice and the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations193. 
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  See, e.g., Goldwater v. Rossi, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
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  U h l e r / C o u r s i e r / S i o r d e t / P i l l o u d / B o p p e / W i l h e l m / S c h o e n h o l z e r  (note 
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IV. Ceterum Censeo: What Was Left Out in the Hamdan Case 
1. The Prohibition of Torture 
The Hamdan Court did not consider the legality of using unusual interrogation 
techniques at Guantanamo Bay, as there was no allegation of such practices in this 
case. Such an enquiry would have been dangerous and beyond the scope of the de-
cision. However, it should be reminded that this is yet another fundamental ques-
tion which needs to be resolved in order to improve the treatment of prisoners 
held at Guantanamo Bay. Given the Court’s finding that H a m d a n  benefits from 
the protections of Common Article 3, the question arises whether other Guan-
tanamo detainees who were allegedly tortured could also invoke its provisions in a 
court of law.  
1.1. Prohibition of Torture in International Law 
The prohibition of torture is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights194 (Article 5), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights195 
(Article 7), the American Convention on Human Rights196 (Article 5(2)), the Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights197 (Article 5) and the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment198 as an absolute right (no derogation is permitted, even in case of emer-
gency). Torture is also prohibited by the Geneva Conventions199 in cases of inter-
nal conflicts (Convention I, Article 3, Section 1A), wounded combatants (Conven-
tion I, Article 12), prisoners of war in international conflicts (Convention III, Arti-
cle 17), civilians in occupied territories (Convention IV, Article 32), civilians in in-
ternational conflicts (Protocol I, Article 75, Section 2Ai) and civilians in internal 
conflicts (Protocol II, Article 4, Section 2A).  
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  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), 
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
195
  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force March 23, 1976, for the 
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  American Convention of Human Rights, entered into force July 18, 1978, not ratified by the 
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Doc CAB//LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
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  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, entered into force June 26, 1987, for the United States October 21, 1994, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
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  Geneva Conventions (note 10) supra. 
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1.2. Prohibition of Torture on the Constitutional Level 
The American Constitution states in Article IV that “[t]his Constitution, and 
the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme law of the land; (…)”. It does not explicitly prevent torture, 
but it does condemn cruel and unusual punishment (Amendment VIII), unreason-
able search and seizure (Amendment IV) as well as self-incrimination (Amendment 
V). The Supreme Court has held in the past that due process includes the prohibi-
tion of torture and illegal confinement.200 It was also found that it is difficult to 
conceive of a method more revolting to the sense of justice than torturing someone 
to extract information and to use these confessions as the basis for conviction and 
sentence.201  
1.3. Prohibition of Torture on the Federal Law Level 
The United States enacted in 1994 the Torture Convention Implementation 
Act202 in order to implement the Convention Against Torture203 into domestic law. 
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tion, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures cal-
culated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (c) the threat of imminent death; or (d) the 
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Convention against Torture with several reservations. See for further information, Declarations and 
Reservations, United States of America, available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ 
ratification/9.htm#reservations> (accessed November 3, 2006). See also Frederic L. K i r g i s , Distinc-
tions Between International and U.S. Foreign Relations Law Issues Regarding Treatment of Suspected 
Terrorists, ASIL Insights, June 2004, available at: <http://www.asil.org/insights/insight138.htm> (ac-
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  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment (note 198) supra. The Convention defines torture under Article 1 (1) as “(…) any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such pur-
poses as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he 
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or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering 
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
  A New Era for the Supreme Court After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld? 35 
ZaöRV 67 (2007) 
The Torture Convention Implementation Act provides that “[w]hoever outside 
the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any per-
son from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or im-
prisoned for any term of years or for life”204. There is jurisdiction over torture 
when “(…) the alleged offender is a national of the United States (…)”205 or if he or 
she “(…) is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim 
or alleged offender”206. In addition, the War Crimes Act207 provides that 
“[w]hoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a war crime, in 
any of the circumstances described in subsection (b), shall be fined under this title 
or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death results to the vic-
tim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death”208. The offender or the victim 
must be a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the 
United States for the Act to apply. Furthermore, the Military Extraterritorial Ju-
risdiction Act209 provides for the prosecution of crimes committed by the Armed 
Forces outside the United States210. Finally, the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
holds that cruelty, oppression, maltreatment and maiming are prohibited.211 There 
are also civil actions212 available under specific circumstances to those that were 
submitted to torture under the Alien Tort Claims Act213 and the Torture Victim 
Protection Act214. 
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  Torture Victim Protection Act 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992). For further discussion on the prohibi-
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1.4. Disastrous By-Passing Tactics by the B u s h  Administration 
Despite this plethora of international instruments and national legislation, the 
Bush Administration used various legally questionable tactics during the war on 
terror in order to circumvent them. As part of its policy for preventing future ter-
rorist acts, the U.S. Government issued several memoranda and documents allow-
ing the use of certain interrogation techniques, which according to international 
law may amount to torture and/or cruel and unusual punishment. In two of these 
memoranda, the August 1, 2002 Department of Justice Memorandum entitled 
“Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 2340 – 2340A”215 and the 
March 6, 2003 Department of Defence Memorandum entitled “Working Group 
Report Re: Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment 
of Legal, Historical, Policy and Operational Considerations”216, the B u s h  Ad-
ministration was attempting to explore the legal consequences of using unusual in-
terrogation techniques. Both memoranda advocate a permissive view of torture and 
an expansive one of presidential power217, even suggesting that torture may be le-
gal. In December 2004, the Justice Department released a revised version of the 
August 1, 2002 Memorandum entitled “Legal Standards Applicable under 18 
U.S.C. §§2340-2340A”218, which revoked the previous Memoranda but still con-
tained several inadequacies. While the definition of torture was broader, the other 
sources of applicable law were not considered (e.g. the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice219, the Geneva Conventions220, etc.). The Memorandum did not clarify fur-
ther the President’s unchecked power as Commander-in-Chief described in the 
August 1, 2002 Memorandum nor did it reject the legal defences against criminal 
liability available to staff officials. It further seemed to reaffirm that the President 
has complete discretion in his actions as Commander-in-Chief which do not need 
to be approved by Congress. Thus, it continued to employ the exclusive approach 
to presidential power.221  
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  B y b e e  (note 131) supra.  
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  U.S. Department of Defense (note 134) supra. 
217
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The interrogation policies mandated by the B u s h  Administration were initially 
used in Guantanamo and subsequently in Afghanistan and Iraq. The inevitable 
happened: it all came out into the open when the Abu Ghraib scandal broke out, 
revealing that Iraqi detainees were abused by U.S. intelligence personnel during in-
terrogation.222 The treatment of Iraqi detainees was considered as being “tanta-
mount to torture” by the International Committee of the Red Cross in its report 
on the subject.223 Since then, many previous Guantanamo detainees have come 
forward to tell their stories of ruthless interrogations and detention, leaving little 
doubt that U.S. practices amounted to torture.224  
The United Nations have not remained silent in the face of such blatant abuse of 
international law. Recently, the United Nations Economic and Social Council is-
sued (as part of the Commission on Human Rights) a report where it calls for the 
closing of Guantanamo Bay and states that certain interrogation techniques used 
by U.S. officials may amount to torture.225 The Report further asserts that the Ex-
ecutive “(…) operates as a judge, prosecutor and defence counsel of the Guan-
tanamo detainees: (…)”226. In addition, the United Nations Committee Against 
Torture recently stated in its concluding observations227, following the submission 
of the second U.S. report, that the United States “(…) should rescind any interro-
gation technique, including methods involving sexual humiliation, ‘water board-
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ing’, ‘short shackling’ and using dogs to induce fear, that constitute torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (…)”228. 
2. Enemy Combatant Status 
The notion of “enemy combatants” was first mentioned in the Ex Parte Qui-
rin229 decision.230 In fact, the Quirin court used the terms “unlawful combatant”, 
“enemy bellingerent” and “enemy combatant” interchangeably and the term “en-
emy combatant” appeared only once in its decision.231 For the Court, an enemy 
combatant was a person “(…) who without uniform comes secretly through the 
lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property (…) [is] gen-
erally deemed not to be entitled to the status of ‘prisoners of war’, but to be ‘of-
fender[s] against the law of war’ subject to trial and punishment by military tribu-
nals”232. Generally, the court preferred to use the term “unlawful combatant” and 
defined it in these words: “By universal agreement and practice, the law of war 
draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of bel-
ligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. 
Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by op-
posing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and 
detention, but, in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tri-
bunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.”233 
The term “enemy combatant” is not defined anywhere in international law. 
Rather, it is only the term “unlawful combatant” which could be legitimately con-
sidered as falling under the 1949 Geneva Conventions234. Article 4 (A) 1 of the 
Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war235 contains criteria which 
differentiate civilians from lawful combatants and others who should not be 
granted prisoner of war status. In order to be granted prisoner of war status a per-
son must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, must have a 
fixed distinctive sign that is recognisable from a distance, must be carrying arms 
openly and must be conducting an operation in accordance with the laws and cus-
toms of war. The term “unlawful combatant” is not defined, but it has been de-
rived from the definition of a “lawful combatant”.236 It is a short hand expression 
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used to describe those civilians who take up arms without being authorised to do 
so by international law.237 It has a purely descriptive character and a third category 
of persons does not exist as such.238 “Unlawful combatants” are either members of 
the regular forces or members of resistance guerrilla movements that do not fulfil 
the conditions of lawful combatants.239 
Nonetheless, it is not the term “unlawful combatants” which has prevailed in 
the Supreme Court’s language over the years, but rather “enemy combatants”. In 
the context of the war on terrorism, the term “enemy combatant” has acquired a 
different meaning from the one applied during World War II. The B u s h  Admin-
istration has claimed the right to designate potential terrorists as “enemy combat-
ants” in order to detain them without charges, judicial review and access to a law-
yer and to try them by military commission. This was used in order to prevent 
captured combatants from continuing to aid the enemy. The concept of “enemy 
combatant” is now defined in the military order establishing the Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal as “(…) an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al 
Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners”240. 
In Hamdan, Justice S t e v e n s  referred several times to the term “enemy com-
batant” while considering legislation applicable to the case and arguments set forth 
by the government. He did not examine the merits of such a classification. Hence, 
the Court demonstrated great deference to the Executive by not questioning the 
determination of “enemy combatant” status as applied to H a m d a n . The case was 
remanded for further proceedings, and thus, it seems that the question was left to 
the lower courts.  
The Court should not merely rubber stamp Presidential determinations of en-
emy combatant status, but rather actively question their merits. Also, as described 
earlier, the meaning of the term “enemy combatant” seems to have changed from 
the moment it was originally used in the World War II era case law. This modifica-
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tion has gone unnoticed by the Court, but it certainly needs to be considered and 
explained. Finally, the terminology used in international humanitarian law should 
have been embraced by the Justices, instead of the President’s custom-made defini-
tion of enemy combatant. The current legal situation of the so-called “enemy com-
batants” is highly controversial, and it clearly deserves a better day in court than 
the one it has been given thus far.  
3. Impracticability 
While reviewing the rules of procedure applicable by the military commission 
created to try H a m d a n , Justice S t e v e n s  reminded that presidential power to 
create such rules is restricted by two requirements mentioned in Article 36 of the 
UCMJ241. First, procedural rules may not be “contrary to or inconsistent with” the 
UCMJ242 and, second, they must be “uniform insofar as practicable”. This latter 
requirement means that “(…) the rules applied to military commissions must be 
the same as those applied to courts-martial unless such uniformity proves imprac-
ticable”243. The Government argued that the rules of procedure are not inconsistent 
with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and that military commissions would 
be of no use if the provisions relative to courts-martial contained therein would be 
applicable.244 Furthermore, it would be impracticable to apply the principles of law 
and rules of law recognised in district courts given the danger to the United States 
and the nature of international terrorism.245 The Court found “(…) that complete 
deference is owed to that determination”246. However, it did explain that the Presi-
dent has not “(…) made a similar official determination that it is impracticable to 
apply the rules of courts-martial”247. It was also explained in a footnote that “(…) 
such a determination would be entitled to a measure of deference”248. The Court 
gave an example of such a determination indicating that it could be “(…) any logis-
tical difficulty in securing properly sworn and authenticated evidence or in apply-
ing the usual principles of relevance and admissibility”249. In the case at hand, how-
ever, the only reason offered for departing from the rules applicable in courts-
martial was the danger posed by international terrorism, and this was found to be 
insufficient. 
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From the above, it appears that the Court did not explain in great detail what it 
may consider as a true impracticability and it only gave one example. In fact, it de-
termined what an impracticability is not, but it did not precisely explain what it 
may be. Thus, the Court left the door open for various possibilities, which could 
be difficult to determine at present. Once again, it could be that the Court did not 
want to limit its powers as well as the powers of the President in this field. Signifi-
cantly, it was signalled that the President would have “a measure of deference” in 
relation to determinations of impracticability, and stating this, the Court may not 
have felt entirely competent to decide the question at hand. 
V. Conclusion 
Although the Hamdan decision does not represent a new era for the Supreme 
Court, it crystallises the Court’s position on issues directly related to the war on 
terror and it sends an authoritative message to the various actors involved in this 
conflict. The Court made a rare assertion of power by actively intervening in this 
case and by reaching a verdict unfavourable to the B u s h  Administration. For a 
long time, it seemed that the President always won in foreign affairs250. This was 
due to the fact that the Executive took the initiative, Congress acquiesced and the 
Supreme Court showed deference.251 The Hamdan decision stands in great contrast 
with the long-standing tradition of judicial deference which dominated case law in 
the World War II era. This trend has become increasingly apparent in the early 
cases on the war on terror leading up to Hamdan. In these decisions, there is inter-
esting progression in the Court’s opinions which is characterised by a more inter-
vening judiciary, a narrower interpretation of presidential powers and a reaffirma-
tion of the Court’s and the Congress’ role. 
From these developments, it appears that the Court’s self-conception within the 
domestic framework has gained momentum, and that the Court no longer acts 
only as a rubber stamp of the Executive’s decisions. The Court is feeling more 
competent to intervene in war time decisions, especially those which are not care-
fully justified by the President. It is also much more cautious and scrutinises the 
Executive’s evidence with greater care. The balancing of interests of both parties is 
more careful and it takes greater account of civil liberties. Furthermore, the Court 
is more prudent in finding congressional authorisation for the President’s deci-
sions, which reinforces the position of Congress within the war powers context. 
Thus, the Court has recuperated its legitimate role which consists in upholding 
civil rights in times of war or peace and in performing checks on the powers exer-
cised by the other branches. Therefore, the Hamdan decision is certainly the most 
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important judgment of the Supreme Court on the national security constitution 
since the landmark decision Youngstown Sheet & Tube252. 
Nonetheless, it should be emphasised that the majority ruling is a fragile one, 
given the votes cast. Also, the circumstances under which Hamdan was decided 
could explain the verdict reached. The international criticism of the Guantanamo 
Bay detention facilities is blatant and continuous, and the Court made a first step 
toward the resolution of this dilemma. The Hamdan decision can be understood as 
an attempt of the Court to help save the reputation of the B u s h  Administration. 
By setting boundaries to certain powers of the Executive in this context, the Court 
merely voiced the concerns of the international community and implicitly pre-
vented further international scandals from occurring. In addition, the case was de-
cided within the framework of the war on terror, which has become a conflict of 
indefinite duration between undefined enemies and unfettered Presidential powers. 
It is not a war involving a tangible threat, and the Court may have felt less bound 
by the usual deference it demonstrates to the Executive in times of a traditional 
war.  
In relation to the reception of international humanitarian law, the Court’s con-
sideration of the relevant provisions is less impressive and innovative. The Court 
conveniently left certain important questions aside and tailored an international 
law approach which is safe and uncontroversial. Moreover, certain features of the 
U.S. legal landscape as well as certain circumstances in this case favoured the “in-
ternational law-friendly” result reached by the Court. 
Finally, it should be reminded that the Hamdan decision is one of the stepping 
stones which may lead to an improvement in the situation of Guantanamo detain-
ees. Although several questions are still pending and many uncertainties remain re-
garding the fate of the detainees, the Hamdan decision is a reliable precedent for 
future development. Undoubtedly, further governmental and congressional inter-
ventions as well as court decisions will be necessary to bring justice to the hun-
dreds of suspects still held in Cuba.253 Perhaps one day, we will finally ensure that 
laws will never again be silent in Guantanamo Bay. 
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